


PBHI 2025 ANNUAL REPORT

Reframing Security:

From State Repression to Citizens Protection
(Human Security)



PBHI NASIONAL

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PBHI

Compiled by : PBHI National Executive Board
Authors : Riana A Ibrahim, Muhammad Ikhsan Mahar, Agnes Theodora,
A. Marthin Hadiwinata
Editor : Julius Ibrani
Design and Layout : PBHI Publication and Campaign Team

About PBHI at a Glance

The Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI) is a non-profit association founded on November 5, 1996 by human rights advocates, including Hendarji, Luhut MP Pangaribuan, Rocky Gerung, Siti Soendjati, Maria Pakpahan, and other prominent figures.

PBHI is a membership-based organization (comprising individual legal aid and humanitarian activists) established with the purpose of advancing and defending human rights be it through case handling, assistance and defense of victims of human rights violations, empowerment of affected communities, human rights research and development, or national and international policy advocacy.

PBHI operates alongside its regional chapters across 10 provinces: North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Lampung, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, Bali, West Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi. The 6th PBHI Congress, held on November 5-7, 2021, mandated a focus on grassroots strengthening through strategic issues, including: initiating and improving inclusive and progressive human rights policies, strengthening protection for human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, advancing ecological justice through environmental protection, improving natural resource governance and addressing ecocide crimes as well as reforming civil supremacy and liberties.

The 6th Congress also elected Julius Ibrani as Chair of PBHI's National Executive Board, who subsequently appointed Gina Sabrina as Secretary and Regina JBF Astuti as Treasurer. The leadership prioritizes institutional strengthening through gender equality mainstreaming, protection of women and vulnerable and disabled groups, and accountability mechanisms.

Website and Social Media Channels:

Website : pbhi.or.id
E-mail : seknas@pbhi.or.id
Instagram : [@pbhi_nasional](https://www.instagram.com/pbhi_nasional)
Twitter : [@pbhi_nasional](https://twitter.com/pbhi_nasional)
YouTube : PBHI Nasional
Address : Jl. Hayam Wuruk No. 4 SX-TX, RT/RW 09/005, Kebon Kelapa, Gambir, Central Jakarta, Special Region of Jakarta 10120 – INDONESIA

PBHI Regional Offices

PBHI operates in 10 regions: North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Lampung, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, Bali, West Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Brief Overview of PBHI	2
PBHI Regional Offices	3
Table of Contents	4
About PBHI	5
PBHI Logo	6
2025 Annual Report Theme	7
Introductory Reflection	9
How We Work	11
PBHI Network	15
PBHI Strategic Plan	19
Key Achievements	26
Special Coverage	27
Publications	29
Special Achievements	30
Internal Strengthening	32
2025 Legal Aid Case Trends	34
Partners	35
Supporting Partners	36

ABOUT PBHI

VISION

The realization of a state that fulfills its obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.

MISSION

- To promote universal human rights values;
- To defend victims of human rights violations;
- To educate members and prospective members as human rights defenders.



PBHI LOGO



An image of a white dove breaking through metallic blue prison bars within a black square block.

Meaning of the Logo:

- Symbolizes PBHI's consolidated unity between national and regional offices, reflecting shared issues and realities of human rights violations across various levels and geographic areas.
- Affirms PBHI's independent, objective, and value-free advocacy.



THEME

"Reframing Security: From State Repression to Citizens Protection (Human Security)"

Prabowo Subianto, a former member of the Tim Mawar (Team Rose) unit, became president through a direct electoral process born out of the Reformasi era. His victory appeared to promise renewal through flagship programs such as the Free Nutritious Meals and the Red-and-White Cooperative. In reality however, these developments have proven to be a nightmare.

PBHI anticipated this regression from the outset. Signs of democratic backsliding were predictable, starting from the intensification of securitization approaches through the expanding involvement of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in civilian domains, all the way to intelligence operations aimed at weakening civil society movements.

The closure of democratic space became apparent in the first year of the Prabowo-Gibran administration. Within a single year in office, 5,538 individuals were recorded as victims of violence perpetrated by security apparatuses during peaceful mass demonstrations opposing the ratification of the TNI Law, demanding labor welfare protections, and rejecting increases in lawmakers' allowances.

Meanwhile, the revision of the TNI Law was passed within only 20 working days without meaningful public consultation. Oversight institutions were even targeted for weakening, as evidenced by the dissolution of the Papua desk and the stagnation of investigations into past gross human rights violations.

The regime has also consolidated power by co-opting opposition figures into government positions and distributing mining concessions to various mass organizations. At the same time, the regime further marginalized critical figures and groups. As a result, opposition forces are fragmented and nearly non-existent.

Indonesia's 2024-2025 policy trajectory became clearer, in which we are now seeing a shift from consensual hegemony toward repressive domination. This shift was first visible in how the state drafted regulations. It was then followed by political elites consolidation across all branches of government (executive, judicial, and legislative). As documented by the civil society coalition for security sector reform, the TNI Law revision was completed by the House of Representatives (DPR) in merely 20 working days without public hearings involving civil society.

This entire sequence of developments aimed to push human rights back to their weakest point by institutionalizing security apparatus repression within regulatory frameworks. One example lies in the revision of the TNI Law, which expands the scope of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) from 14 to 16 tasks. These include “empowering defense territories and the supporting forces from the outset in accordance with the universal defense system,” and “assisting in addressing cyber threats.” The first phrase potentially opens the door for the recruitment of vigilante mass organizations as “supporting civilian forces” for domestic security operations, which was already legitimized under Law No. 23 of 2019 on National Resource Management for State Defense.

Restrictions on cyberspace have likewise intensified through enforcement measures, blocking and throttling access under the pretext of national security. The government previously employed similar tactics in 2019 to suppress protests in Papua. Current legislative discussions on the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill and the Surveillance Bill further indicate the government’s intent to narrow civic space online.

This expansion of authority is not merely administrative. It must be understood as a securitization strategy, which is transforming political issues into security threats. Narratives such as “a strong state ensures a safe people” and “TNI is strong together with the people” serve to legitimize repression under the guise of defending the state from “radicalism and separatism threats.” By framing labor protests, farmers’ demands, or journalistic criticism as “security threats,” the state justifies excessive force and the deployment of defense and security apparatuses.

PBHI strongly suspects intelligence involvement in the August 2025 protests. Civil society was deliberately weakened through engineered vertical divisions, scapegoating “anarchists” and foreign funding. Such divisions serve to perpetuate impunity, which in turn aligns with efforts to weaken oversight institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial), and the National Police Commission (Kompolnas).

This structured legal impunity creates space for increasingly massive and systematic state violence. For democratic movements, this constitutes a clear attempt at silencing dissent. Elites can stabilize the order, even without genuine hegemony, if opposition forces are fragmented, divided, and passive.

It is time for civil society to unite and challenge this injustice. Not through frontal attacks that will be brutally repressed, but through sustained efforts to build collective awareness and strength across all elements of civil society.

A crisis of hegemony is both danger and opportunity. It is dangerous because fascism can grow under such conditions, as occurred in Germany under Hitler. Yet it is also an opportunity, because it means the old order is cracking, and space for alternatives has opened. Will Indonesia be trapped in a fragile and worsening authoritarianism, or will genuine democratization rooted in material justice emerge? The answer depends on the capacity of our resistance and our political imagination today. The 1998 Reformation opened the door to democracy, but that door is now being pushed shut. The question is whether we are strong enough to prevent it from being locked or even to open it wider.

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTION

The face of authoritarianism began to develop during Jokowi's second term, which was visible in efforts to legalize repressive actions through various regulations. The enactment of the new National Criminal Code (KUHP Nasional) in 2023 served as the gateway. This tendency became increasingly massive when discussions emerged in 2024 regarding revisions to the Police Law (UU Polri) and the TNI Law (UU TNI), which in their deliberations tended to expand the authority of security and defense actors. This effort has also aligned with the increasing placement of active security personnel in civilian positions, which was ultimately legalized through related regulations. Populist policies have functioned as a mask for political opportunism in order to continuously sustain power.

The hijacking of law has continued under the current regime. Efforts to legalize repression began when the government foregrounded a securitization approach that has resulted in physical, non-physical, and digital terror. This terror appears to target human rights defenders, as seen in the criminalization of Fatia-Haris, Septia Dwi Pertiwi, and Bambang Hero Saharjo—all human rights defenders who have worked and spoken truthfully. The criminalization of these key movement actors clearly constitutes an elite effort to subdue the law so that it can be bargained over and bought.

The securitization approach has intensified with the ratification of the TNI Law, which legitimizes the expansion of the deployment of soldiers into civilian domains to 17 principal tasks. The extremely rapid deliberation and passage of the TNI Law, which negated meaningful participation, further confirmed the strengthening of securitization. The acceleration of deliberation and ratification of various pieces of legislation appeared to apply only to regulations that strongly open new "revenue streams" or facilitate certain groups. By contrast, discussions of amendments to other laws such as the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), the Election Law, and the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (ITE) have been far from meaningful participation principles, and the government has even tended to claim the advocacy efforts that were done by civil society groups regarding problematic articles within those regulations. In fact, these regulations risk further narrowing civic space. Numerous technical terms are used to wrap these changes, but the impact is clear: criticism is more easily treated as disruption, protest is more easily labeled as a threat, and arrests can be justified as matters of security.

Not only formal state apparatuses are involved; militarism has also seeped into society, as evidenced by the proliferation of mass organizations that emulate military styles and often act as vigilantes. They frequently appear in civil conflicts, control certain areas, extort money under the pretext of “security fees,” intimidate communities, and more. Their proximity to public officials, government authorities, and formal state institutions makes them appear as groups that are deliberately maintained. This is reinforced by Law No. 23 of 2019 on National Resource Management for State Defense (PSDN) concerning Reserve Components. Reserve Components, as part of national defense efforts, may be mobilized to respond not only to military threats but also to non-military and hybrid threats. Because non-military threats lack clear boundaries, Reserve Components can potentially be utilized for particular purposes, including by oligarchic interests.

All of this forms a network of power capable of moving beyond the boundaries of defense functions and penetrating civilian life. Meanwhile, justice institutions are weakening. Oversight does not function, and impunity becomes commonplace. Democracy declines not only because the apparatus grows stronger, but because the law has legalized militaristic practices. Allegations of intelligence involvement in the August 2025 protests further extend this democratic regression. Strengthening impunity for security and defense apparatuses has resulted in consequences that are only limited to ethical sanctions. Tragically, security forces have continued to pursue protesters, who are in fact civilians and pro-democracy activists.

The prospects for democracy in this country appear increasingly fragile, eroded by security and defense apparatuses that increasingly choose repression in responding to their own citizens’ voices. Each time peaceful protest is met with intimidation, arbitrary arrest, or violence that is never fully explained. Democracy, which should live through the courage of citizens to speak and the ability of the state to listen, becomes an empty ritual when criticism is treated as a threat. Without a genuine commitment to accountability and respect for civil rights, the political trajectory appears to be moving away from democratic principles toward a darker landscape increasingly inaccessible to citizens who wish to be heard.



Julius Ibrani
Chair of National Executive Board PBHI





HOW WE WORK

The securitization approach has been underway since Jokowi’s second term. It began with the legalization of spaces for criminalization and repression designed to continuously silence civil society. The way to test this approach has been by targeting key actors and figures through criminalization. This effort has continued in parallel with the consolidation of political elites toward the elections, ultimately producing leadership that clearly supports exploitation in the name of development and investment.

Entering 2025, the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s administration, the securitization approach has become increasingly overt and intensive. Socio-political issues that provoke critical public opinion are framed as foreign threats to national sovereignty. The pretext of maintaining security stability as a foundation for economic development is then used to justify actions that violate human rights.

The involvement of the Indonesian Military (TNI) has also intensified. One example is its deployment in business investment projects, such as Rempang Eco-City, following large-scale community pushback expressed through repeated protests since 2023. The military deployment to the ground in early 2025 was aimed at suppressing unrest among local communities. This practice has drawn criticism because it frequently generates fear among local residents and triggers violence that violates human rights.

The experience of the past ten years, during which the TNI has been involved in the implementation of government projects, appears to serve as legitimacy for Prabowo and his cabinet, which is dominated by military figures, to strengthen their grip in order to compel public compliance. The labeling of citizens who refuse such projects as “separatist groups” or “rebels” even continues to be used.



Recent events in Aceh, which has been affected by disaster, further demonstrate how such labeling becomes a tool to justify military violence. Residents who staged a white-flag protest due to the

government's failure to respond to disaster management after nearly a month were instead confronted with repressive actions by soldiers.

Over the past decade, PBHI has documented numerous projects involving the TNI, including the Food Estate project in several regions, particularly in Merauke, South Papua; security operations for PT Freeport Indonesia in Papua; security operations for PT Dairi Prima Mineral in North Sumatra; security operations for PT Inexco Jaya Makmur in West Sumatra (2018); security operations for PT Duta Palma in West Kalimantan (2024); involvement in the dispossession of customary lands of the Indonesian Civil Guard of Struggle Board (BPRPI) by PTPN II in North Sumatra (2020); the Bener Dam National Strategic Project (PSN) in Wadas (2021); the CNI Group's Nickel Smelter PSN in Southeast Sulawesi (2022); and the Lau Simeme Dam PSN in North Sumatra (2024).

The military involvement has gained further space following the passage of the revised TNI Law by the House of Representatives without meaningful public participation. Not only appearing on the ground, the TNI has also begun monitoring cyberspace, reinforcing the militarization of digital space. Unfortunately, this has not been exercised proportionately within its function related to cyber warfare threats or external territorial defense. Instead, the TNI has targeted civil society.

In addition to the TNI, the police have also intensified repression against the public. Throughout 2025, notable incidents occurred during incidental protest actions, such as demonstrations rejecting the TNI Law and the protests in August–September 2025 that resulted in the death of online motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan.

The state's response through the police is no longer limited to crowd control, but has shifted toward coercive intelligence operations. As a result, patterns of handling demonstrations, especially incidental ones, have exceeded legal limits. Narratives of "hijackers" and "treason," accompanied by false-flag operation concepts, have resurfaced to justify repressive actions and massive intelligence surveillance.

During the August–September 2025 protests—later referred to as Black September—the burning of public facilities occurred again with the apparent aim of discrediting protesters as anarchic mobs. Calls circulating through social media posters urging riots became a new *modus operandi* within this operation.

This narrative then served as the basis for sporadic arrests of several activists and civilians, including Delpedro Marhaen, Syahdan Husein, Muzaffar Salim, Khariq Anhar, and Laraz Faizati. They were accused of masterminding efforts to incite protesters to commit arson through social media posts. Laras was even prosecuted and demanded a one-year prison sentence, while police officers who ran over Affan received only administrative sanctions.

The entry of TNI and police forces onto university campuses has also occurred. As a result, student discussions within universities have faced intimidation. Books were confiscated without clear criteria regarding the objects seized. This series of actions strengthens the indication of intelligence-designed strategies to weaken civil movements and spread mass fear.

Amid intensifying exploitation, the silencing of dissent and democratic regression increasingly pierce civil society. Social and political issues that could in fact be addressed through dialogue and developmental policy are instead answered with coercive securitization measures that silence through repression that has been legalized by regulation.

The culmination of the securitization approach is the normalization of authoritarianism. When securitization becomes a strategy deemed normal and authoritarian government actions are accepted without debate, then state instruments and security apparatuses can ultimately take repressive measures against particular groups or individuals.

The face of democracy then becomes an “intelligence democracy”, which appears to be procedurally intact but in practice controlled by security apparatuses whose position and function are increasingly strengthened by regulation. The situation in 2025 appears as a reincarnation of the New Order that had once lain dormant. The state is attempting once again to become an entity that must be feared and cannot be criticized. The fundamental difference is that today’s apparatuses are armed not only with batons and combat boots, but also with algorithmic weapons in cyberspace and legal provisions modified to suit their needs.

While securitization may provide temporary advantages in addressing certain threats, in the long term it can erode democratic foundations and public trust in government. In Indonesia, this approach has become an effort to perpetuate a culture of impunity among security forces, reduce civic space by severing the chain of public criticism toward power, and exacerbate social tensions. To counter the threats posed by securitization, PBHI together with other civil society networks intervenes through works that center on **policy advocacy and strategic litigation, institutional capacity**



building, documentation and research, consolidation of victims and civil society organizations, as well as publications and campaigns.

Amid the complex shrinking of democracy and human rights, PBHI Chair Julius Ibrani received a significant recognition for institutionalized legal aid and human rights work carried out alongside PBHI, reflecting more than 30 years of positive institutional contribution. In 2025, PBHI received the 20th Democracy and Human Rights Award 2025 from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). Chair Julius Ibrani dedicated this award to victims of human rights violations and to those who courageously stand in solidarity, even at the risk of their safety, freedom, and lives.



PBHI NETWORK



In its efforts to strengthen civil society, PBHI continues to expand its networks and partnerships, while undertaking various processes of reconsolidation to generate tangible impact. Through advocacy work, research, and broad-based campaigns, PBHI carries out its efforts in collaboration with grassroots communities, victims, as well as engaging with civil society networks and state institutions focused on human rights (HAM), particularly in initiatives aimed at strengthening civic space in Indonesia.

1. Policy Advocacy and Strategic Litigation

Throughout 2025, the existing situation has compelled PBHI to undertake strategic advocacy targeting impactful policies and future legal reform. As in previous years, policy advocacy and strategic litigation have continued to position human rights as a protective safeguard for citizens against policies that are increasingly aligned with elite and oligarchic interests.

Among these developments are the ratification of the revised TNI Law, which expands the position and functions of the military within civilian domains; the ratification of the revised Criminal Law Procedures Code (KUHP), which further narrows civic space and perpetuates impunity; and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which raises concerns about suppressing freedom of expression and posing a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law.

To counter these developments, PBHI has actively initiated and participated in various policy advocacy processes, including the revision of the Legal Aid Law, which has entered deliberation within the National Law Development Agency (BPHN); the Surveillance/Spyware Bill; the National Security Bill; the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill; the Government Regulation on Living Law; the Government Regulation on the Commutation of



the Death Penalty to Life Imprisonment and to Fixed-Term Sentences; Government Regulation No. 17/2025 concerning the Governance of Electronic Systems in the Protection of Children (PP Tunas); and the Presidential Regulation Draft on Terrorism. In addition, PBHI served as part of the drafting team for National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) Regulation No. 16 of 2025 on the Right to Food, an important instrument to prevent food policy from being framed through a securitization lens. PBHI has also pursued strategic litigation through formal review and material review petitions against the TNI Law.

2. Institutional Capacity Building

To equip its members, staff, and interns in human rights work, PBHI regularly conducts internal capacity-building initiatives, both in academic knowledge and practical skills, through internal classes and participation in external trainings and forums. These efforts aim to strengthen PBHI's human resources in human rights work and to break cycles of over-personalization within the institution.

PBHI has also strengthened grassroots engagement through the activation of ecological justice paralegals, providing litigation and non-litigation assistance at conflict sites related to National Strategic Projects (PSN), as well as producing campaign materials such as short films to disseminate information and mobilize solidarity.

Staff participation in external initiatives has included holistic security training for PBHI's internal team to address threats, restrictions, and violence, as well as mechanisms for strengthening both individuals and the organization against future attacks targeting PBHI's human rights work; and training on advocacy review and mechanisms at regional and international levels together with the FORUM ASIA network, as a follow-up to analyses of democratic regression and human rights violations.



3. Documentation and Research

Documentation and research are inseparable components of PBHI's advocacy work. They form the basis for policy advocacy and strategic litigation aimed at driving policy change and shaping advocacy roadmaps for resolving

human rights violations. Throughout 2025, PBHI focused on advocacy for the abolition of the death penalty through proposals for alternative mechanisms to commute death sentences to life imprisonment, and life imprisonment to fixed-term sentences; mitigation of the impacts of formalizing living law, including risk mapping and mitigation strategies for its application toward vulnerable groups; and efforts to improve the quality of legal aid services through standard service guidelines and assessments of legal aid budgets; advancing protection and fulfillment of the rights of victims of trafficking in persons (TPPO); and proposals for victim compensation mechanisms.

PBHI also conducted routine monitoring of human rights violations in Papua as a basis for analyzing the government's approach to the conflict in Papua. One output was the Human Rights Violation Report in Papua for the January-September 2025 period, titled "Papua Is Not Empty Land: Conditioning Through Security Approaches, Dialogical Resolution Is Merely Rhetoric."

PBHI also monitored and issued a report on the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program. Monitoring findings indicated that this initiative has not been treated as part of the state's responsibility to guarantee the right to food in a sustainable and unconditional manner, in accordance with Article 11 of Law No. 11 of 2005 and international instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). PBHI's monitoring is crucial to ensure that the program does not become merely a superficial social assistance policy, but truly implements food sovereignty principles that empower local farmers and respect sustainable production methods. Without strict oversight, there is a risk that the program will become dependent on global food industries and multinational corporations, often associated with land grabbing and environmental degradation, contrary to the spirit of Law No. 18 of 2012 on Food. Therefore, PBHI emphasizes the importance of community participation and clarity in resource distribution to ensure that fulfillment of the right to food aligns with the right to health and social justice, rather than merely meeting caloric intake with no regard to the sovereignty of local food producers.

4. Consolidation of Victims and Civil Society Networks

The consolidation of victims and civil society networks plays a crucial role in advancing human security and counterbalancing the state's securitization approach. Strengthening solidarity among victims of human rights violations,



alongside strengthening civil society networks, provides a foundation for pursuing justice while safeguarding democratic hope. This underscores that PBHI does not work alone. Various civil society organizations that share this journey play strategic roles in public education, fostering dialogue, and monitoring violations committed by security apparatuses. A human security-based approach that places human rights at the center of policy, rather than securitization, combined with the magnitude of consolidated victim strength across various forms of state-perpetrated violations, has become non-negotiable.

5. Publications and Campaigns

Amid democratic and human rights decline in 2025, the dissemination of information and campaign activities serve as crucial driving mechanisms to raise public awareness, expand solidarity networks, and obstruct the normalization of repressive actions. Through reports, declarations, press releases, and narrative campaigns both offline and online, advocacy efforts highlight human rights violations that are often neglected while urging the state to remain subject to accountability. Publications and campaigns function not only as channels for information dissemination but also as trigger mechanisms for human rights defenders, ensuring that with public support we continue to be vocal in advancing human rights.

According to the 2024 Democracy Index released by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Indonesia is categorized as a flawed democracy. Democratic decline has tended to occur throughout the past decade, influenced in part by the human rights component within the civil liberties dimension. Indonesia's score in this dimension remains relatively low compared to the other three dimensions: electoral process and pluralism, political participation, and functioning government.

This aligns with PBHI's publications and campaigns throughout 2025. The revision of the TNI Law, amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Law Procedures Code, and police violence as manifestations of authoritarianism within law enforcement institutions have been central concerns. Repression during the August 2025 protests, the use of political buzzers, and repression amid the Sumatra flood disaster illustrate how state violence has become increasingly institutionalized through policy and the attitudes of nearly all levels of government. For this reason, PBHI's publications and campaigns constitute as an effort to expose the extreme narrowing of civic space and the escalating normalization of militarism.



PBHI STRATEGIC PLAN

The main mandate of PBHI's organizing work based on the results of the 7th PBHI Congress consists of 4 (four) strategic issues, each strategic issue comprising several core issues with their respective activities and output achievements. The four main activities are:

1. Initiation and Reform of Inclusive and Progressive Human Rights Policies.

The initiation and reform of comprehensive and forward-looking human rights policies continue to be carried out by PBHI through various strategic approaches, both through constitutional litigation and policy advocacy. One significant action is the submission of a material and formal judicial review against Law Number 3 of 2025 concerning the TNI together with the security sector coalition, as a response to the increasing influence of the military in civilian life and the weakening of democratic oversight. This effort affirms PBHI's dedication to ensuring that defense and security policies remain aligned with the principles of civilian supremacy, accountability, and respect for human rights.

In addition, PBHI actively seeks to improve the legal framework that guarantees access to justice for vulnerable groups. Together with the National Law Development Agency, PBHI is pushing for the revision of the Legal Aid Law, with the required academic paper currently being drafted by the Directorate General of Legislation. Furthermore, PBHI is also conducting advocacy in the deliberation of the Government Regulation Draft on Living Law and the Government Regulation Draft on the Commutation of the Death Penalty into Life Imprisonment and Fixed-Term Sentences, which are highly important to ensure that the implementation of the National Criminal Code, which will take effect in 2026, is aligned with human rights principles. Through this participation, PBHI seeks to ensure that national criminal law does not focus solely on punishment, but also gives attention to



substantive justice, protection for vulnerable groups, and limitation of state power. This effort becomes a crucial foundation so that the transition toward the National Criminal Code does not strengthen repressive practices, but instead reinforces guarantees of justice and humanity within Indonesia's legal system.

Similar efforts have also been undertaken in discussions concerning the Criminal Law Procedures Code, particularly those related to strengthening guarantees of legal aid, which were conveyed by PBHI in a Public Hearing Meeting (RDPU) with the House of Representatives Commission III. All of these efforts serve as concrete steps taken by PBHI to realize innovative and inclusive human rights policies, at a time when civil liberties are increasingly shrinking and the military approach in state governance is becoming more aggressive.

In strategic litigation, the case of criminalization experienced by Alex Denni clearly demonstrates how the legal system is often misused, and underscores how essential sustained human rights protection is. PBHI together with criminal law experts Dr. Rocky Marbun, SH., MH, Dr. Vidya Prahassacitta, SH., MH, and Dr. Ahmad Sofian, S.H., M.A. conducted an analysis of the cassation decision in the Alex Denni case to critically examine the application of law and the arguments presented by the judges. This analysis highlights the existence of serious issues within the legal structure, evidentiary process, and the use of prosecutorial power that may deviate from the principles of justice and due process. The findings of these experts reinforce the view that the Alex Denni case reflects structural problems within the criminal justice system, while also serving as a basis to call for more comprehensive institutional reform. This case also functions as a foundation for PBHI to continue pushing for reforms within the judicial system, particularly in improving the institutions of the Attorney General's Office and the Supreme Court, so that law enforcement can operate independently, responsibly, and free from abuse of power.


Through these various measures, PBHI consistently remains on its path, namely the effort to build inclusive policy standards. For without inclusive standards, marginalized groups will become the first victims of aggressive government policies. Viewed sociologically, PBHI's actions and initiatives also aim to change public perceptions of the law. The law ought to be fair to everyone without exception, in accordance with the principles of justice in law which consistently affirm equality before the law and the impartiality of law enforcement. The hope is that neither justice nor human rights will be compromised.

These interventions, using legal reasoning to challenge law that has been hijacked by the interests of power, are not merely administrative corrections but systemic reform to ensure that the pulse of democracy continues to beat without human rights violations against anyone who speaks critically and fights for their rights.

2. Strengthening the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Women Human Rights Defenders

In 2025, PBHI together with civil society networks carried out strategic litigation advocacy at the cassation level in the case of the criminalization of a female

worker, Septia Dwi Pertiwi, former employee of PT Hive Five, a company owned by influencer Jhon LBF. Septia became a defendant in an alleged defamation case after revealing through her social media account various labor rights violations she experienced while working at the company. Septia, as a female worker, had to face Jhon LBF as a business owner supported by government elites who attempted to “mediate” her case. The case became irregular when the Public Prosecutor charged Septia under provisions that were no longer in force, namely: Article 27 (3) in conjunction with Article 36 in conjunction with Article 51 (2) of the ITE Law concerning defamation and/or insult resulting in harm. And also Article 27 (3) in conjunction with Article 45 paragraph (3) of the ITE Law concerning insult and/or defamation. Both criminal charges were still based on the 2008 ITE Law as amended by Law 19/2016 amending Law 11/2008 on ITE. This case is not merely a labor dispute and a criminal ITE Law case, but a transformation of the victim into a woman human rights defender, as well as a demand for judicial reform, particularly within the institutions of the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court.



3. **Ecological Justice through Environmental Protection, Improvement of Natural Resource Governance, and the Prosecution of Ecocide Crimes**

Strengthening the issue of Ecological Justice through Environmental Protection, Improvement of Natural Resource Governance, and the Prosecution of Ecocide Crimes became one part of PBHI’s strategic work in 2025. At the end of 2024, PBHI launched a report on Ecocide and ecological threats that are moving further away from the values of justice. Improvements in natural resource governance become mere rhetoric when numerous concessions are granted to corporations; moreover, the existence of Presidential Regulation No. 5/2025 which grants military officers authority to carry out forest area enforcement further exacerbates efforts to improve natural resource governance. Criminalization of environmental defenders and Indigenous communities such as in the cases of Poco Leok, Maba Sangaji, and others increasingly demonstrates the absence of government intent to prosecute ecocide crimes.

PBHI’s Declaration on Ecocide entitled “The State in the Grip of Concession Capitalism, the People in the Danger of Ecological Extinction” in mid-2025 reaffirmed PBHI’s critical view toward the direction of national development that places extractive projects and National Strategic Projects (PSN) above environmental safety and people’s right to life. PBHI assesses that the pattern of concession capitalism legitimized by the state has resulted in systemic environmental destruction, dispossession of living space, and prolonged suffering for Indigenous peoples and local communities, which in many cases fulfill the

elements of ecocide crimes. PBHI urges explicit recognition of ecocide as a grave human rights crime, including in the context of PSN implementation, and demands accountability from the state and corporations for ecological destruction that is deliberate, massive, and sustained.

So far, corporations have only been subjected to relatively light penalties, with fines that are sometimes already calculated as 'operational costs' of the company. By using the "ecocide" terminology, this forces the state to acknowledge that ecosystem destructions occurring in large-scale land clearing in Papua, Kalimantan, and various PSN target regions constitute as attacks on the survival of humanity. For this ecocide is not merely an administrative violation but a form of grave human rights violation equivalent to an extraordinary crime.

Not only the criminalization of environmental defenders and Indigenous communities, but also structural poverty that continues to take root among residents surrounding mining circles and PSN areas proves that natural wealth is extracted for oligarchs while local residents only receive environmental impacts such as pollution, water contamination, and loss of living space.

In addition to prosecuting ecocide crimes, PBHI also launched a strategy to break the chain of natural resource oligarchy by examining how environmental permits are granted to corporations and actors with political proximity to those in power, resulting in permits that often overlap or do not align with their intended allocation. This is also suspected to have occurred in the Sumatra flood disaster at the end of 2025. Several major companies appointed by the government to conduct environmental exploitation, which led to this environmental disaster, had engaged in such practices for nearly three decades, yet reactive legal action was only taken by the government after flash floods struck Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra. This also cannot be separated from public pressure that compelled the government to impose sanctions on the related companies.

In addition, the Anti-SLAPP instrument strengthened by the Constitutional Court through Decision Number 119/PUU-XXII/2025 became a breath of fresh air because it expands legal protection for activists, reporters, witnesses, and environmental experts from criminalization for fighting for the right to a good and healthy environment. This also ensures that critical voices are protected from various forms of intimidation, particularly legal intimidation, so that cases such as that experienced by Bambang Hero Saharjo do not occur again. Bambang, an academic from the Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), was sued by PT Kalimantan Lestari Mandiri after providing expert testimony in court that led to the company losing against the Environment Ministry.

On the other hand, this instrument also prevents the government from acting arbitrarily against environmental defenders, considering that the direction of development through natural resource-based economic growth under the Prabowo-Gibran administration appears highly aggressive. The continuation of PSN and downstreaming policies are evidence of this. Therefore, protection for environmental defenders becomes crucial. Returning to the "ecocide"

terminology, this serves as a resistance against the narrative of security stability continuously constructed by the government to justify actions that violate human rights under the pretext of investment.

4. Reform of Civilian Supremacy and Civil Liberties

The strengthening of civic space became one part of PBHI's strategic work in 2025. Threats to civil liberties encompassing the dimensions of freedom of opinion, expression, association/assembly, and the criminalization of human rights defenders have continuously been voiced by PBHI through various legal aid agendas as well as the preparation of studies and dissemination of knowledge to the public through various forums together with other civil society coalitions.

Throughout 2025, freedom of expression in Indonesia has shown a significant downward trend, marked by the strengthening of securitization approaches in responding to criticism, citizen expression, and socio-political dynamics. An important indicator can be seen in the alleged involvement of the PIK 2 National Strategic Project (PSN) that emerged after PBHI discovered the existence of a Sea Fence in Tangerang, a finding that instead triggered various forms of pressure rather than transparent explanation from the state. This situation was worsened by reports of intimidation against the band Sukatani, demonstrating that artistic and cultural expression are not immune from silencing. Instead of being protected as part of freedom of expression, public criticism and expression are treated as security threats that must be controlled.

At the same time, the strengthening role of TNI apparatus within civilian space further narrows that space of freedom. The widespread involvement of the military in the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program as the president's priority program, the increasing shooting cases such as that which occurred in Way Kanan, Lampung, and the legitimization of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) within the TNI Law demonstrate the normalization of military presence in civilian domains. This condition potentially opens expansion of TNI authority with minimal civilian control and accountability. The presence of the Criminal Law Procedures Code within this

fg Media

POLRI SEBAIKNYA DI BAWAH PRESIDEN ATAU KEMENTERIAN?

Ketua PBHI: Tak Akan Ada Pengaruh, Selama Polri Jauh dari Masyarakat

"Tak akan ada perubahan. Ditepatkan di manapun Polri, selama dia jauh dari masyarakat, maka dia hanya menjadi alat kekuasaan untuk merepresi masyarakat, untuk mengkriminalisasi aktivis,"

Julius Ibrani
Ketua PBHI
Selasa (10/2/2026)

Pakar Hukum Tata Negara: Secara Ketatanegaraan Justru Lebih Tepat di Bawah Kementerian

"Suatu hal terminologi yang kita sudah kenal paling tidak sejak 2024. Parcok yang menandakan bahwa ternyata kepolisian bisa digunakan oleh orang yang punya kekuasaan untuk memenangkan mereka dalam pemilu,"

"Usulan dari tim reformasi kepolisian mau dibikin sendiri. Jadi, Kementerian Keamanan misalnya, sesungguhnya itu justru lebih baik karena independensinya tetap terjaga,"

Bivitri Susanti
Pakar Hukum Tata Negara
Jumat (30/2026)

Sumber: Beritajatim.com & Kompas.id

context raises new concerns that it may not sufficiently safeguard human rights, particularly freedom of expression. All of these dynamics show that throughout 2025, freedom of expression has been increasingly pressured by a state security logic that positions criticism and dissent as risks rather than as essential elements of democracy.

The series of protests that occurred throughout 2025 also faced repression. In August 2025, an online motorcycle taxi driver, Affan Kurniawan, lost his life after being run over by a police tactical vehicle. Not only that, the arrest of more than 1,700 people, the majority of whom were minors accused of being involved in demonstrations that ended in unrest, represents the face of law enforcement that has become increasingly repressive. The designation of 959 individuals as suspects, including activists and members of civil society accused of incitement during the August 2025 demonstrations, also shows how the space of freedom of expression continues to narrow through the brutality of apparatuses.

One example is Laras Faizati, who at the time of writing was undergoing trial and was demanded a one-year prison sentence by the Attorney General's Office because her personal Instagram post was alleged to provoke residents to burn down a police building. Laras' post was in fact an expression of disappointment as a member of society toward the situation of the country at that time. This arbitrary designation of suspects demonstrates how law enforcement institutions perpetuate a climate of fear within society, instead of carrying out their function of protecting the public. The Law on Electronic Information and Transactions was used once again in this case to ensnare members of the public.

Attacks within digital space were also intensively carried out to deepen the climate of fear in society. This was felt when mass media began to be affected in reporting on the Sumatra flood disaster. The government through the Communications Agency was alleged to have intervened directly by requesting several mass media outlets to retract news reports that showed government delays in handling the disaster. The patterns above are systematic efforts viewed as having the potential to return Indonesia to a new-style authoritarian era.

PBHI is also the only independent organization that pushes for a Police Reform program. This is clearly reflected in PBHI's active participation in various forums and advocacy together with civil society coalitions to ensure that the internal reform process of the Indonesian National Police follows democratic principles, accountability, and respect for human rights. As a leading non-profit organization on this issue, PBHI is involved in public dialogues held with the Chief of Police and civil society coalitions, where PBHI conveyed various critical aspirations regarding the importance of preserving democratic space, preventing excessive use of force by apparatuses, and strengthening Police's transparency and professionalism in carrying out their duties. Within these dialogues, PBHI not only functions as a constructive critic, but also as a strategic partner providing significant input to improve police governance, strengthen external oversight mechanisms, and ensure that the Police can carry out their role as protector of society without violating the fundamental rights of the people. PBHI's involvement in pushing for

Police reform thus becomes an important element of the organization's efforts to create a democratic, responsive security system that respects the rule of law in Indonesia.



KEY ACHIEVEMENTS



2243
Media Coverage
(including
YouTube)



41
Joint Press Releases
with Coalitions



56
Press
Releases



1
Book
Publication



5
Public
Discussions



9
Legal and Human Rights
Discussions (#DUHAM)



6
Press
Conferences



2
Complaint Posts



11
Monitoring Reports



1
Strategic Litigation on the issue of
Civilian Supremacy (Judicial Review
of the TNI Law)



1040
YouTube Subscribers



36.600 Instagram Followers
9.891 X Followers
2.299 TikTok Followers



SPECIAL COVERAGE



There were 12 PBHI trending topics in 2025 documented across various media platforms as follows:

1. PIK 2 PSN Sea Fence Case

TEMPO Hukum Perilaku Kriminal

Kriminal

PBHI: Pemasang Pagar Laut Tangerang Melanggar 13 Peraturan Perundang-undangan

PBHI menemukan ada 13 peraturan perundang-undangan yang ditabrak dalam kasus pemasangan pagar laut di perairan Tangerang, Banten.

2. Johnson Panjaitan

Tolak PBHI & Advokat Johnson Panjaitan Meninggal, Ini Prokilnya

3. National Police Transformation Team

YouTube FG media

POLRI Bakal Diubah: Reformasi atau Kepentingan Politik?

4. The TNI's "New" Task: Forest Area Enforcement

TEMPO Hukum Perilaku Kriminal

Kriminal

PBHI: Perpres No 5 Tahun 2025 Bertentangan dengan Pengusutan Korupsi Tata Kelola Sawit di Kejaksaan Agung

PBHI menilai Perpres No 5 Tahun 2025 bertentangan dengan langkah Kejaksaan Agung yang tengah mengusut korupsi tata kelola sawit di KLHK.

5. Police Reform

MEDIA INDONESIA E-Paper

PBHI Soroti Komisi Reformasi Polri, Disebut Berpotensi Ada Politisasi

6. Criminal Law Procedures Code (KUHP)

HUKUM ONLINE Hukumonline Stream Data Pribadi Juru

6 Poin Krusial Catatan PBHI Untuk RKUHAP

Mencakup penyelidikan dan penyidikan, penyelesaian perkara di luar pengadilan, saksi mahkota vs justice collaborator, pengawasan eksternal dan linear, hak atas bantuan hukum, dan persidangan terbuka untuk umum.

7. Housing Allowance for Members of the House of Representatives



8. Alleged TNI Involvement in the Death of a Young Diplomat



9. Alleged Intelligence Operations in the August 2025 Unrest



10. Abolition Granted to Tom Lembong



11. Judicial Review of the TNI Law at the Constitutional Court



12. Criminalization of Activists Following the August 2025 Mass Protests




13. Police Confiscation of 'Leftist' Books




PUBLICATIONS



Policy Paper: Promoting the Effective, Just, and Dignified Commutation of the Death Penalty and Life Imprisonment



The Calloused Fingertips of Johnson Panjaitan: Fighting for Liberation



18 REASONS WHY WE MUST REJECT THE RATIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURES CODE BILL (RUKUHAP)!



DAFTAR INVENTARISASI MASALAH: Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Tata Cara Perubahan Pidana Penjara Seumur Hidup dan Pidana Mati



DAFTAR INVENTARISASI MASALAH: Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Tata Cara dan Kriteria Penetapan Hukum yang Hidup dalam Masyarakat

PBHI'S WORK 2025

- Recognition of legal standing in the prohibition of mining on small islands
- Public support on human rights violations and criminalization experienced by communities affected by environmental destruction
- Access to justice for victims of agrarian conflicts
- Awareness among victims of National Strategic Projects (PSN)
- Public awareness of the crime of genocide

ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, IMPROVEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE, AND THE PROSECUTION OF ECOCIDE CRIMES

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

- Access to justice for human rights defenders
- Recognition of human rights defenders
- Widespread support and solidarity
- Involvement of advocates in defending human rights defenders
- Recovery of human rights defenders from criminalization

REFORM OF CIVILIAN SUPREMACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

- Formal and material judicial review of Law 3/2025 on the TNI before the Constitutional Court
- Conducting an investigation into the sea fence case in Tangerang, strongly suspected to be linked to a National Strategic Project (PSN)
- Public rejection of presidential interference in the 2024 elections
- Encouraging rejection of the TNI and Police Laws together with civil society
- Complaint post regarding the circulation of adulterated rice in the community
- Public awareness in safeguarding the 2024 General Elections and Regional Elections
- Public oversight of law enforcement and ethics in cases of repressiveness

KERJA PBHI 2025 (2)

JUDICIAL REFORM

- Public understanding in overseeing the judiciary ✨
- Broad public support for judicial reform ✨

LABOR

- Encouraging reform of the partnership system for online transportation drivers ✨
- Encouraging freedom of expression to improve working conditions ✨

PAST GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

- Public support for #MelawanLupa regarding Past Gross Human Rights Violations cases ✨
- Public pushback against the projec of rewriting history ✨
- #MenolakLupa campaign ✨

LEGAL AID AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

- Standardization of the quality of legal aid services ✨
- Quality legal services ✨
- Expansion of access to legal aid ✨
- Co-creation of access to justice policies ✨

PAPUA

- Broad public support for the rejection of military operations in Papua ✨
- Extensive dissemination of monitoring findings on the right to freedom and expression in Papua ✨
- Evaluation of the security approach and deployment of apparatuses in Papua ✨
- Encouraging dialogue through a human rights-based approach ✨

INITIATION AND REFORM OF INCLUSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES

THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN TOBACCO CONTROL

- Strengthening regulation on tobacco and electronic cigarette control ✨
- Public awareness of tobacco-related issues ✨
- Encouraging implementation of PP Tunas (Government Regulation No. 17 of 2025 on Child Protection in Digital Spaces) ✨
- Public awareness of the dangers of conventional and electronic cigarettes ✨

STRENGTHENING INCLUSIVITY

- Massive public rejection of various issues within Article 2 of the Criminal Code (KUHP) ✨
- Public participation and monitoring of the Law on Maternal and Child Welfare bill (RUU KIA) ✨
- Public participation in derivative regulations of Article 2 of the KUHP ✨
- Improvement of the Government Regulation Draft on Living Law in Society ✨

IMPROVING NARCOTICS GOVERNANCE

- Strengthening governance reform through policy ✨
- Encouraging stronger victim rehabilitation measures ✨

ERADICATION OF TORTURE

- Victim awareness in the recovery process ✨

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

- Public understanding of human trafficking (TPPO) ✨
- Monitoring the restoration of victims' rights in TPPO cases ✨
- Improvement of standards for handling TPPO cases ✨

DEATH PENALTY

- Public awareness of death penalty issues ✨
- PBHI's involvement in drafting the Policy Brief on Risk and Impact Mitigation of the Regulation of Living Law in Society in the Formulation of Implementing Regulations of the Criminal Code ✨
- Realization of the Government Regulation Draft on the Commutation of the Death Penalty into Life Imprisonment and Fixed Term Sentences within the National Criminal Code ✨

INITIATION AND REFORM OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES

Various initiatives and reforms of human rights policies in 2025 were carried out through several activities, including:



PBHI together with the Community Legal Aid Institute (LBHM) was involved in drafting the Policy Brief on the Risks and Impact Mitigation of the Regulation of Living Law in Society in the Formulation of Implementing Regulations of the Criminal Code (KUHP).



PBHI together with the Tifa Foundation was involved in the Open Government Indonesia 2025 discussion raising the theme "The Role and Challenges of Journalists in the Current Democratic Climate in Indonesia."



3.

PBHI, Imparsial, PSHK, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan LBH Indonesia), and LBH Jakarta were involved in the Judicial Review, both Formal and Material Review, of Law No. 3/2025 concerning the TNI.



4.

at Nasional PBHI

PBHI conducted monitoring of human rights violations within the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) Project as one of the National Strategic Projects. Following this monitoring, it proceeded with a public discussion themed “MBG: CONVERGENCE BETWEEN NEEDS, THE OBLIGATION TO FULFILL THE RIGHT TO FOOD, AND GOVERNANCE.” The discussion was attended by Uli Parulian from the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), Center for Indonesia's Strategic Development Initiatives (CISDI), and Marthin Hadiwinata from FIAN Indonesia.

INTERNAL STRENGTHENING

Throughout 2025, PBHI continued to promote internal capacity building in order to enhance organizational capability and the resilience of human rights defenders amid the shrinking democratic space. These programs included external trainings in the areas of campaigning and writing to strengthen advocacy strategies and build public narratives, alongside training on holistic security in the context of increasing threats against human rights defenders. Holistic security is understood not only as physical protection, but also encompassing digital, psychosocial, and organizational aspects, considering that human rights advocacy activities are now frequently confronted with intimidation, criminalization, and repressive actions. Through this internal strengthening, PBHI seeks to ensure the sustainability of advocacy efforts while safeguarding the individual and collective safety of those directly involved in human rights defense.


Furthermore, the five-year updating of the PBHI membership database was also conducted in 2025. This step constitutes a strategy to map modalities, advocates' expertise, and members' distribution across various regions in preparation for the PBHI Congress in 2026. Training on legal aid service standards is also conducted regularly in order to provide optimal assistance to vulnerable groups. PBHI's internal strengthening also underscores the expansion of strategic coalitions with grassroots communities up to international networks. This is also in response to the shrinking of civic space and formal legal channels that at times have been co-opted by power, so that a mass base and grassroots networks become a source of strength.

Staff Assignment for Capacity Building

1. Social Justice Leaders 2025 training initiated by Public Virtue to study holistic security for human rights activists.

2025 LEGAL AID CASE TRENDS

Based on the trend of legal aid cases handled by PBHI in 2025, there are three categories each accounted for 23.1% of the cases. These three categories are (i) finance/online lending; (ii) labor; and (iii) family, which together made up 69.3% of all the legal aid cases received. The high number of finance/online lending and labor cases is also related to mass layoffs that ultimately dragged communities into online debt entanglements. This also reflects unequal labor relations for the working class. This situation is further exacerbated by a securitization approach when the state regards labor issues as threats to national stability or public security. This is clearly apparent in the state's response through the use of security apparatuses to control labor protests.



A number of actions that workers participated in during May Day 2025 were again met with violence. In Central Jakarta, for example, dozens of police officers surrounded medical personnel on duty. They were forcibly searched, beaten, and arrested. In Semarang, there were entrapment arrests disguised as ambulances. The labeling of protesters as "anarcho" also reoccurred.

Meanwhile, another labor action was held at the National Monument (Monas) in Jakarta, which was attended by President Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo even delivered a speech at the rally. The participants in that action did not experience repression from the authorities.

Many legal aid applicants handled by PBHI do not possess the knowledge of or access to the legal system to report their cases. The structural legal aid carried out by PBHI helps bridge this gap.

The second highest category is sexual violence, comprising 15.4% of the total cases assisted by PBHI in 2025. This indicates that sexual violence cases, particularly against women, continues to hinder efforts to create safe spaces for women and people of diverse sexual identities in Indonesia.

Although the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes has come into force, victims of sexual violence still face difficulties in accessing justice. Deeply rooted power relations, a culture of shame and social stigma, as well as technological developments persist, causing victims to feel anxious about their safety and face victim-blaming that puts them at risk of being revictimized.

On the other hand, the development of safe spaces for women and people of diverse sexual identities in Indonesia remains largely symbolic. This cannot be separated from policymakers who are dominated by patriarchal perspectives, resulting in legal products that still fail to side with women and people of diverse sexual identities in Indonesia.

The third highest category consists of fraud and doxxing, accounting for 7.7% of the total cases handled by PBHI in 2025. The abundance of information amid current technological developments has resulted in widespread misinformation that ultimately disrupts rational decision-making processes. This contributes to polarization and vertical conflict within society, which often ends in threats to civil liberties and undermines the security of digital civic space.

This bolsters the frequency of uncontrollable personal data leaks, making it easier for perpetrators of fraud and doxxing to target victims. The existence of the Personal Data Protection Law has not been optimized to protect citizens from such incidents, but instead is utilized as a means to facilitate intelligence monitoring and securitization approaches.

On the other hand, citizens' digital literacy is not yet fully established, so education and outreach must be conducted regularly and periodically so that prevention can begin from individuals themselves. Nevertheless, the government must guarantee public safety in digital spaces so that practices of vigilante justice or misuse of citizens' personal data can no longer be carried out through cyberspace.

SUPPORTING PARTNERS

Throughout 2025, PBHI carried out many activities with several supporting partners, namely:



British Embassy
Jakarta

WORKING PARTNERS



COALITIONS



Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil
Kawal Pemilu **Demokratis**



KOALISI PEMILU BERSIH